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The death of long-time political activist Szeto Wah of lung cancer early this year provided an opportunity for Hong Kong to show the world that it is truly autonomous except in matters of defense and foreign affairs—an opportunity that was unfortunately not grasped.
Two leaders of the Tiananmen Square student protest of 1989, Wang Dan and Wu’er Kaixi, both of whom now live in exile, asked to visit Hong Kong for the sole purpose of attending the funeral to show their respect for Mr. Szeto who, as chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China until his death, had each year sponsored a well-attended march and a candlelight vigil to commemorate those who died in the military crackdown on June 4, 1989 and to call for their vindication.
Since the Hong Kong Basic Law, proclaimed by China in 1990, gives Hong Kong autonomy in immigration matters, it was technically up to the territory rather than Beijing to decide whether to allow such visits. But, of course, the Hong Kong government is highly sensitive to Beijing’s feelings on all matters.
Almost immediately, it became known that Wu’er Kaixi’s chances of getting a visa were poor. Hong Kong government officials privately recalled that he had been allowed to enter the territory in 2004 to attend the funeral of the Canto-pop singer Anita Mui Yim-fong, who had supported the 1989 democracy movement. However, they said, instead of adopting a low profile as promised, the former student leader gave a speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club and accepted media interviews. It was clear that they felt his word could no longer be trusted.
Different Case, Same Result
Wang Dan, however, was a different case. Unlike Wu’er Kaixi, who had fled the country after the military crackdown, he was arrested and imprisoned twice and eventually was deported. So he had not left China illegally and was not wanted for any crime. Besides, he declared that he would refrain from talking to the press or making public statements and, in fact, would leave Hong Kong immediately after the funeral service, not even spending the night.
Hong Kong officials were evidently seriously considering his visa request. They held negotiating sessions with the democrats regarding the activities that Wang Dan would engage in during his visit and sought to confirm his pledge that his sole purpose was to honor Szeto Wah, whom he held in high respect.
In some ways, this was similar to the situation in mid-2010, when the Democratic Party proposed an amendment to Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s political reform package. After the Chinese government had given its blessings, the Hong Kong authorities conducted talks with the Democratic Party to clarify whether its legislators would
vote for the package if the Tsang administration accepted the party’s proposed amendment. Once it became clear that there was a deal, the Tsang administration announced acceptance of the amendment and the Democrats stuck to the bargain, ensuring passage of the package in the legislature.
This time, it appeared, the process was similar. Hong Kong officials pressed the democrats for a commitment on the restrictions that Wang Dan would be under if they allowed a visit, and that commitment was made. Secretary of Security Ambrose Lee said in the legislature that Hong Kong “will not reject a visitor’s entry application purely because of his religious belief or political stance.”
But, in the end, Wang Dan was denied a visa. He reacted by calling “one country, two systems” a lie. The impression, inescapably, is that the Chinese government withheld its blessings and Hong Kong was left to “decide” that it would not permit a visit by Wang Dan.
This was an opportunity missed, by both Hong Kong and Beijing. If the Tiananmen Square student leader had been allowed to visit and attend the funeral of Szeto Wah, it would have sent a signal to the whole world that there was an autonomous government in Hong Kong 13 years after the handover and an enlightened government in Beijing 21 years after the massacre.
Neither Yes Nor No
Earlier, the new director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, Wang Guangya, was asked in Beijing whether a visit by Wang Dan would be allowed. Instead of saying yes or no, he responded that the matter was in the hands of Hong Kong officials and expressed confidence that they would “handle it well.” In reality, the only reason why Hong Kong would deny such a visit is fear of Beijing’s anger over such a move. So if Beijing had wanted to signal that it had no objection, it could have signaled this by saying something to the effect that “the matter should be managed pragmatically and appropriately.”
Those were the exact words used by another Chinese official, Wang Yi, when he wanted to show that the mainland was not opposed to Taiwan negotiating the equivalent of free trade agreements with other countries. Beijing knows how to make clear its position on sensitive issues without having to openly declare its consent—or its opposition.
The decision to deny Wang Dan a visa was a reflection of the limited degree of Hong Kong’s autonomy, regardless of what the Basic Law may say. No Chief Executive is likely to take any action knowing that it would anger Beijing, even if theoretically he has the right to make such a decision.
The travails of Donald Tsang’s political reform package last year also reflected the changed political environment in Hong Kong. Because of a decision made by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in 2009, the chief executive was not allowed to increase the proportion of directly elected members of the legislature, which is currently 50%, with the others elected by special interest groups known as functional constituencies.
In an attempt at political reform that stays within the NPCSC decision, Mr. Tsang proposed creating a new functional constituency that consisted only of directly elected members of District Councils—local bodies responsible for such things as advising on parks, libraries and other local affairs. He proposed that elected district councilors would in turn elect five members to serve in the Legislative Council.
The Democratic Party went one better. It proposed that instead of limiting the electorate of this new functional constituency to district councilors, roughly three million voters—anyone who did not belong to an already existing functional constituency—would elect the five legislators from the ranks of district councilors. Then followed highly visible discussions between the Democratic Party and the Liaison Office, which is the Chinese government’s representative body in Hong Kong.
Donald Tsang on the Sidelines
The Tsang administration was edged out, since it could not decide if the Democratic Party’s proposal was consistent with the Basic Law. Chinese officials in Hong Kong and Beijing suggested loudly that it not only violated the Basic Law but also the 2009 decision of the NPCSC.
Ultimately, the central government decided to accept the Democrats’ proposal, probably because otherwise the political reform package was doomed and Donald Tsang’s ability to govern Hong Kong would be put in doubt. But because the negotiations were conducted by the central government, it became obvious to everyone who was calling the shots in Hong Kong—and it wasn’t Donald Tsang.
More than 13 years after Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty, there has been visible narrowing of the autonomy promised to the former British colony. At the same time, there has been much change in the attitude of the Hong Kong people. While in 1997 many people wanted to keep the mainland at arm’s length, today there is a keen awareness that Hong Kong needs to hitch its wagon to the Chinese red star now that the mainland has the world’s second largest economy so as to grow along with it.
Moreover, while 13 years ago China’s policy was to allow maximum autonomy while reining in its own supporters, today there has been an 180-degree turn and the administration of Chief Executive Donald Tsang has tacitly agreed to give pro-Beijing individuals in the community—such as deputies of the National People’s Congress and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—positions of influence by appointing them to advisory committees. What caused the sea change was the mammoth demonstration of 2003, when over half a million people marched amid a prolonged recession to protest against a national security bill that many feared would erode their basic rights and freedoms.
Today, the economy is booming and Financial Secretary John Tsang declared in his budget address in February that, instead of the HK$25 billion (US$320 million) deficit that he had predicted last year, Hong Kong had actually enjoyed a surplus of HK$71 billion (US$910 million). In order to ensure a buoyant economy, the government and leading business people want Hong Kong to do what has traditionally been anathema to capitalists: adopt a five-year economic plan or, rather, join the mainland’s 12th five-year plan, 2011-2015. So, while the Basic Law stipulates that under the policy of “one country, two systems” Hong Kong is not meant to practice “the socialist system and policies” of the mainland, the territory has argued aggressively to be included in the mainland’s five-year plan.
Joining a Socialist Plan
Five years ago, during the drafting of China’s 11th five-year plan, Hong Kong elbowed its way in and obtained one paragraph in the document in which Beijing voiced its support for maintaining Hong Kong’s status as an international center for financial services, trade and shipping as well as for the development of logistics, tourism and information services.
For the 12th five-year plan beginning in 2011, there has been much closer coordination between Hong Kong and the mainland, with experts from Beijing’s National Development and Reform Commission being invited to Hong Kong for discussions. Hong Kong officials also held talks with representatives of neighboring Guangdong province about the territory’s role in the new plan.
In 2006, voices were raised against Hong Kong being included in China’s five-year plan. For example, Tony Latter, a former deputy chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, wrote an article in the South China Morning Post headlined “We don’t ‘do’ planning.” Now, there is hardly a dissenting voice. Nonetheless, Qiao Xiaoyang, deputy secretary general of the National People’s Congress, in a speech February 17, attacked “a small number of people” who, he said, “treated Hong Kong as an independent or quasi-independent political entity.”
Mr. Qiao, addressing Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress as well as local delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Shenzhen, discussed the issue of Hong Kong’s inclusion in the five-year plan. “To discuss the issue of including Hong Kong in the national strategic planning,” he said, “we must have a correct understanding of the position of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy in the national development strategy and a correct understanding of the indispensable relationship between Hong Kong and the country.”
The senior Chinese official, who has often handled issues involving Hong Kong and the central government, criticized the reluctance of some officials in the years immediately after the handover to strengthen economic cooperation with the mainland. He said that in the future, Hong Kong should formulate its economic development strategy based on that of the mainland but he insisted that the major power of decision would rest with Hong Kong.
Some details of the plan were release March 5 at the annual session of the National People’s Congress. In addition to reiterating pledges of support for Hong Kong to raise its status as an international financial, trade and shipping center, the plan designates it as an offshore hub for renminbi business. The plan also pledges support for developing the new pillar industries identified for further development by the Tsang administration. These are education, medical services, testing and certification, green industries, innovation and technology, and cultural and creative industries.
One early test of Hong Kong’s new relationship with the mainland may lie in a proposal to better integrate the cities surrounding the Pearl River, known as the Action Plan for the Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary. Involving Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong Province, the idea is to further integrate the cities in the Pearl River Delta and improve lifestyles through establishing open spaces with recreational activities. However, few Hong Kong residents were aware of the plan before it was disclosed and quite a few reacted negatively to it. The Deputy Director of Planning, Ling Kar-kan, rejected claims that the mainland was planning Hong Kong’s future development and insisted that the Planning Department would listen to public views on the proposals, which are to be completed by the second half of the year.
While it is not necessary to agree with Wang Dan that “one country, two systems” is a lie, it is certainly true that Hong Kong today does not enjoy the high degree of autonomy that its people had hoped for in 1997. Hong Kong still is different from the mainland in its independent judiciary, its free press and the freedom of its people. But, unfortunately, it is enjoying less autonomy than its people expected in 1997. In fact, quite possibly, it is enjoying less autonomy than the Chinese government had originally intended.
Frank Ching is an analyst of Chinese politics based in Hong Kong. His most recent book is “China: The Truth About Its Human Rights Record,” Rider, 2008
Two leaders of the Tiananmen Square student protest of 1989, Wang Dan and Wu’er Kaixi, both of whom now live in exile, asked to visit Hong Kong for the sole purpose of attending the funeral to show their respect for Mr. Szeto who, as chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China until his death, had each year sponsored a well-attended march and a candlelight vigil to commemorate those who died in the military crackdown on June 4, 1989 and to call for their vindication.
Since the Hong Kong Basic Law, proclaimed by China in 1990, gives Hong Kong autonomy in immigration matters, it was technically up to the territory rather than Beijing to decide whether to allow such visits. But, of course, the Hong Kong government is highly sensitive to Beijing’s feelings on all matters.
Almost immediately, it became known that Wu’er Kaixi’s chances of getting a visa were poor. Hong Kong government officials privately recalled that he had been allowed to enter the territory in 2004 to attend the funeral of the Canto-pop singer Anita Mui Yim-fong, who had supported the 1989 democracy movement. However, they said, instead of adopting a low profile as promised, the former student leader gave a speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club and accepted media interviews. It was clear that they felt his word could no longer be trusted.
Different Case, Same Result
Wang Dan, however, was a different case. Unlike Wu’er Kaixi, who had fled the country after the military crackdown, he was arrested and imprisoned twice and eventually was deported. So he had not left China illegally and was not wanted for any crime. Besides, he declared that he would refrain from talking to the press or making public statements and, in fact, would leave Hong Kong immediately after the funeral service, not even spending the night.
Hong Kong officials were evidently seriously considering his visa request. They held negotiating sessions with the democrats regarding the activities that Wang Dan would engage in during his visit and sought to confirm his pledge that his sole purpose was to honor Szeto Wah, whom he held in high respect.
In some ways, this was similar to the situation in mid-2010, when the Democratic Party proposed an amendment to Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s political reform package. After the Chinese government had given its blessings, the Hong Kong authorities conducted talks with the Democratic Party to clarify whether its legislators would
vote for the package if the Tsang administration accepted the party’s proposed amendment. Once it became clear that there was a deal, the Tsang administration announced acceptance of the amendment and the Democrats stuck to the bargain, ensuring passage of the package in the legislature.
This time, it appeared, the process was similar. Hong Kong officials pressed the democrats for a commitment on the restrictions that Wang Dan would be under if they allowed a visit, and that commitment was made. Secretary of Security Ambrose Lee said in the legislature that Hong Kong “will not reject a visitor’s entry application purely because of his religious belief or political stance.”
But, in the end, Wang Dan was denied a visa. He reacted by calling “one country, two systems” a lie. The impression, inescapably, is that the Chinese government withheld its blessings and Hong Kong was left to “decide” that it would not permit a visit by Wang Dan.
This was an opportunity missed, by both Hong Kong and Beijing. If the Tiananmen Square student leader had been allowed to visit and attend the funeral of Szeto Wah, it would have sent a signal to the whole world that there was an autonomous government in Hong Kong 13 years after the handover and an enlightened government in Beijing 21 years after the massacre.
Neither Yes Nor No
Earlier, the new director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, Wang Guangya, was asked in Beijing whether a visit by Wang Dan would be allowed. Instead of saying yes or no, he responded that the matter was in the hands of Hong Kong officials and expressed confidence that they would “handle it well.” In reality, the only reason why Hong Kong would deny such a visit is fear of Beijing’s anger over such a move. So if Beijing had wanted to signal that it had no objection, it could have signaled this by saying something to the effect that “the matter should be managed pragmatically and appropriately.”
Those were the exact words used by another Chinese official, Wang Yi, when he wanted to show that the mainland was not opposed to Taiwan negotiating the equivalent of free trade agreements with other countries. Beijing knows how to make clear its position on sensitive issues without having to openly declare its consent—or its opposition.
The decision to deny Wang Dan a visa was a reflection of the limited degree of Hong Kong’s autonomy, regardless of what the Basic Law may say. No Chief Executive is likely to take any action knowing that it would anger Beijing, even if theoretically he has the right to make such a decision.
The travails of Donald Tsang’s political reform package last year also reflected the changed political environment in Hong Kong. Because of a decision made by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in 2009, the chief executive was not allowed to increase the proportion of directly elected members of the legislature, which is currently 50%, with the others elected by special interest groups known as functional constituencies.
In an attempt at political reform that stays within the NPCSC decision, Mr. Tsang proposed creating a new functional constituency that consisted only of directly elected members of District Councils—local bodies responsible for such things as advising on parks, libraries and other local affairs. He proposed that elected district councilors would in turn elect five members to serve in the Legislative Council.
The Democratic Party went one better. It proposed that instead of limiting the electorate of this new functional constituency to district councilors, roughly three million voters—anyone who did not belong to an already existing functional constituency—would elect the five legislators from the ranks of district councilors. Then followed highly visible discussions between the Democratic Party and the Liaison Office, which is the Chinese government’s representative body in Hong Kong.
Donald Tsang on the Sidelines
The Tsang administration was edged out, since it could not decide if the Democratic Party’s proposal was consistent with the Basic Law. Chinese officials in Hong Kong and Beijing suggested loudly that it not only violated the Basic Law but also the 2009 decision of the NPCSC.
Ultimately, the central government decided to accept the Democrats’ proposal, probably because otherwise the political reform package was doomed and Donald Tsang’s ability to govern Hong Kong would be put in doubt. But because the negotiations were conducted by the central government, it became obvious to everyone who was calling the shots in Hong Kong—and it wasn’t Donald Tsang.
More than 13 years after Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty, there has been visible narrowing of the autonomy promised to the former British colony. At the same time, there has been much change in the attitude of the Hong Kong people. While in 1997 many people wanted to keep the mainland at arm’s length, today there is a keen awareness that Hong Kong needs to hitch its wagon to the Chinese red star now that the mainland has the world’s second largest economy so as to grow along with it.
Moreover, while 13 years ago China’s policy was to allow maximum autonomy while reining in its own supporters, today there has been an 180-degree turn and the administration of Chief Executive Donald Tsang has tacitly agreed to give pro-Beijing individuals in the community—such as deputies of the National People’s Congress and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—positions of influence by appointing them to advisory committees. What caused the sea change was the mammoth demonstration of 2003, when over half a million people marched amid a prolonged recession to protest against a national security bill that many feared would erode their basic rights and freedoms.
Today, the economy is booming and Financial Secretary John Tsang declared in his budget address in February that, instead of the HK$25 billion (US$320 million) deficit that he had predicted last year, Hong Kong had actually enjoyed a surplus of HK$71 billion (US$910 million). In order to ensure a buoyant economy, the government and leading business people want Hong Kong to do what has traditionally been anathema to capitalists: adopt a five-year economic plan or, rather, join the mainland’s 12th five-year plan, 2011-2015. So, while the Basic Law stipulates that under the policy of “one country, two systems” Hong Kong is not meant to practice “the socialist system and policies” of the mainland, the territory has argued aggressively to be included in the mainland’s five-year plan.
Joining a Socialist Plan
Five years ago, during the drafting of China’s 11th five-year plan, Hong Kong elbowed its way in and obtained one paragraph in the document in which Beijing voiced its support for maintaining Hong Kong’s status as an international center for financial services, trade and shipping as well as for the development of logistics, tourism and information services.
For the 12th five-year plan beginning in 2011, there has been much closer coordination between Hong Kong and the mainland, with experts from Beijing’s National Development and Reform Commission being invited to Hong Kong for discussions. Hong Kong officials also held talks with representatives of neighboring Guangdong province about the territory’s role in the new plan.
In 2006, voices were raised against Hong Kong being included in China’s five-year plan. For example, Tony Latter, a former deputy chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, wrote an article in the South China Morning Post headlined “We don’t ‘do’ planning.” Now, there is hardly a dissenting voice. Nonetheless, Qiao Xiaoyang, deputy secretary general of the National People’s Congress, in a speech February 17, attacked “a small number of people” who, he said, “treated Hong Kong as an independent or quasi-independent political entity.”
Mr. Qiao, addressing Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress as well as local delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Shenzhen, discussed the issue of Hong Kong’s inclusion in the five-year plan. “To discuss the issue of including Hong Kong in the national strategic planning,” he said, “we must have a correct understanding of the position of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy in the national development strategy and a correct understanding of the indispensable relationship between Hong Kong and the country.”
The senior Chinese official, who has often handled issues involving Hong Kong and the central government, criticized the reluctance of some officials in the years immediately after the handover to strengthen economic cooperation with the mainland. He said that in the future, Hong Kong should formulate its economic development strategy based on that of the mainland but he insisted that the major power of decision would rest with Hong Kong.
Some details of the plan were release March 5 at the annual session of the National People’s Congress. In addition to reiterating pledges of support for Hong Kong to raise its status as an international financial, trade and shipping center, the plan designates it as an offshore hub for renminbi business. The plan also pledges support for developing the new pillar industries identified for further development by the Tsang administration. These are education, medical services, testing and certification, green industries, innovation and technology, and cultural and creative industries.
One early test of Hong Kong’s new relationship with the mainland may lie in a proposal to better integrate the cities surrounding the Pearl River, known as the Action Plan for the Bay Area of the Pearl River Estuary. Involving Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong Province, the idea is to further integrate the cities in the Pearl River Delta and improve lifestyles through establishing open spaces with recreational activities. However, few Hong Kong residents were aware of the plan before it was disclosed and quite a few reacted negatively to it. The Deputy Director of Planning, Ling Kar-kan, rejected claims that the mainland was planning Hong Kong’s future development and insisted that the Planning Department would listen to public views on the proposals, which are to be completed by the second half of the year.
While it is not necessary to agree with Wang Dan that “one country, two systems” is a lie, it is certainly true that Hong Kong today does not enjoy the high degree of autonomy that its people had hoped for in 1997. Hong Kong still is different from the mainland in its independent judiciary, its free press and the freedom of its people. But, unfortunately, it is enjoying less autonomy than its people expected in 1997. In fact, quite possibly, it is enjoying less autonomy than the Chinese government had originally intended.
Frank Ching is an analyst of Chinese politics based in Hong Kong. His most recent book is “China: The Truth About Its Human Rights Record,” Rider, 2008
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